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How and Why do Dictatorships
Survive? Lessons for the Middle East
Erica Frantz
olitical events in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) have dominated news headlines
for the past two years. Since the revolution in
Tunisia in December 2010, one dictatorship after the
next has appeared on the verge of collapse, as citizens
gather en masse to voice their demands for democratic
governance. In some countries, such as Tunisia,
democratization seems all but assured following one
of the most successful democratic elections in the Arab
world. In countries such as Libya and Egypt, though
relatively successful democratic elections were held
following the collapse of long-standing dictatorships,
it is uncertain whether the new political system being
installed will be democratic or autocratic. And in
other countries, such as Syria, autocratic government
and pro-democratic forces are locked in a bloody
armed confrontation, the outcome of which is

P

undecided. Elsewhere in MENA,
popular protests demanding democratic
changes fizzled very quickly, and the
region’s dictatorships remain as strong
as ever.

The recent sequence of events in
MENA (commonly referred to as the
Arab Spring) has renewed our awareness that authoritarian regimes dominate the region. Figure 1 illustrates

this. The figure classifies countries
in the developing world according
to whether they are “free” (i.e. fully
democratic), “partly free” (i.e. semidemocracy) or “not free” (i.e. not
fully democratic), using the Freedom
House (www.freedomhouse.org) classifications of political rights and civil
liberties released in 2011, and groups
them by region (the Middle East, East
and Southeast Asia, Latin America, and
Sub-Saharan Africa). More than 90%
of the countries in the Middle East are
either “partly free” or “not free.” In
other words, democracy in the Middle
East is rare. This reality has prompted
many observers to ask: why is the
region so inhospitable to democracy?
Though the dominance of authoritarian governments in the Middle East
seems anomalous at first glance, when
we expand our lens to include the rest
of the developing world, we see that the
experience of the Middle East is quite
common. As Figure 1 shows, outside
of Western Europe and North America,
countries that are “partly free” or
“not free” are the norm. In other
words, democracy is rare not just in
the Middle East; it is rare across the
developing world.
What is peculiar is not that the Middle
East is ruled by dictatorships, but that
it is ruled by such stable ones. Though
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Figure 2 – The Regional Distribution of Coups and Authoritarian Collapse
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political stability seems to many the
last way the Middle East should be
described these days, aside from the
episodes of mass protest that swept
across the region during the Arab
Spring, the trend has largely been one
of political stability.
A comparison with the rest of the
developing world helps illustrate this
pattern. Figure 2 shows the number of
coups (such as the ouster of Mohammad
Mosaddegh in 1953 in Iran) and
authoritarian collapses (such as the
fall of the Iranian monarchy in 1979)
from 1946 to 2009, grouped by region.
Compared to other regions, the occurrence of these sorts of political events is
low in the Middle East (with the exception of East and Southeast Asia, where
fewer coups have happened). Turbulent
events such as coups and authoritarian
collapse occur far less frequently in the
Middle East than elsewhere.
We see a similar story when we look
at the longevity of the dictatorships in
the Middle East and beyond. Between
1946 and 2009, middle eastern dictatorships lasted in power for an average of
41 years. This statistic drops to 27 years
for East and Southeast Asia, 17 years for
Sub-Saharan Africa, and 11 years for
Latin America. Middle eastern dictatorships managed to stay in power more
than a decade longer compared to their
December 2012
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counterparts outside of the region. This
is a sizable difference and prompts the
question: why are middle eastern dictatorships so stable? The answer is plain.
The political stability of the region’s
dictatorships rests in their capacity to
ensure that leadership transitions occur
via expected, established guidelines.
Leadership transitions occur often
within authoritarian regimes. Though
we sometimes view the leader and
the regime as one and the same, the
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persisted since. In fact, in roughly half
the instances when leaders fall from
power, regimes survive the transition.
The reverse side of this statistic is also
telling: the other half of the time when
leaders depart office, regimes collapse.
Leadership transitions are key moments
of vulnerability for dictatorships. When
leaders fall from power – whether due
to natural death, coups, elections, resignations or elite consensus – the most
coveted political position is suddenly

Outside of Western Europe and
North America, countries that
are “partly free” or “not free”
are the norm.
leader is but a single person, whereas
the regime is a network of elites who
have something at stake in the regime’s
continuation. Leaders come and go
often in dictatorships while a regime
remains intact. In Iran, for example, when Supreme Leader Ruhollah
Khomeini died in 1989, the Islamic
Republic did not collapse with him;
instead, Khomeini was succeeded
by Ali Khamenei and the regime has

up for grabs. This political opening
can stoke tensions among elite factions
vying for their preferred candidates,
which can in turn create deep fissures
within the regime that can trigger its
downfall. At the same time, such frenzied political activity can also signal to
members of the opposition movement
(and foreign observers) that the regime
is unstable and that the moment is ripe
to stage a protest or revolt. Leadership
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transitions therefore expose dictatorships to the very real risk that the
regime will be toppled, either internally
(through elite divisions that escalate), or
externally (through mass uprisings or
foreign intervention). As such, regimes
only have a 50/50 shot of surviving
these pivotal moments.
Thus, leadership transitions, do not
always have to be destabilizing. One
of the critical choices that regimes can
make is to establish guidelines for how
leadership turnovers will occur. In other words, dictatorships can regulate the
succession process to ensure that there
are clear rules in place for determining
the conditions under which leaders can
be replaced and the protocols for selecting their successors. In democracies,

fell into this category. In other dictatorships, such as Saudi Arabia, there are
very clear guidelines for determining
leadership transfers; the process is fully
regulated. About 18% of the world’s
dictatorships fell into this category
during the same period (see www.
systemicpeace.org). Most dictatorships
fall somewhere in the middle, having
some protocols in place for deciding
who can replace the leader and under
what conditions, but lacking institutionalization and transparency. The
murkiness means that the process usually entails substantial discussions among
elites that occur behind closed doors.
Where dictatorships have established
succession rules to guide the transfer
of power from one leader to the next,

When looking to the future of the
region beyond the Arab Spring,
one thing seems clear: the Middle
East’s monarchies do not appear to
be going away any time soon.
leaders are typically replaced via free
and fair elections, the rules of which are
usually stipulated in a constitution. In
dictatorships, though free and fair elections for the leadership post are largely
absent, regimes can establish constitutional guidelines for this process.
Though we often think of dictatorships
as political systems where rules have
no meaning, this is far from the reality
in most of them. The extent to which
regimes institutionalize the political
process varies widely from one regime
to the next. In some dictatorships,
such as Spain under Francisco Franco
(1936-75), there are no rules in place
for leadership succession; the process
is unregulated. From 1946 to 2009,
about 13% of the world’s dictatorships
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leadership changes are far less destabilizing. Regulated dictatorships survive
leadership transitions about 60% of
the time; unregulated dictatorships,
by contrast, survive them only 45% of
the time. Setting in place guidelines to
manage the process of succession makes
a substantial difference in protecting
dictatorships during episodes of leadership transition.
For the Middle East, one key factor
in explaining the political stability of
the dictatorships is the pervasiveness
of succession rules. The majority of
the region’s dictatorships are monarchies (which currently include Kuwait,
Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the
UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain). In monarchies, heredity determines who will be

the next leader, and leaders are chosen
from among members of the royal
family. Though such an autocratic
process bars citizens from playing a role
in executive selection, it is does ensure
that leadership succession occurs in a
regulated fashion.
As evidence of this, about 36% of
leadership transitions in the Middle
East from 1946 to 2009 occurred in
a regulated environment. When we
focus solely on the transitions that have
occurred in the monarchies there, this
number is an impressive 100%. By
comparison, in East and Southeast Asia
and Sub-Saharan Africa, only 17% and
14% of leadership transitions, respectively, are regulated, and only about 7%
in Latin America. The evidence suggests that the establishment of rules for
succession in the Middle East, particularly in the region’s monarchies, helps to
explain the political stability there.
When looking to the future of the
region beyond the Arab Spring, one
thing seems clear: the Middle East’s
monarchies do not appear to be going
away any time soon, for all of the
reasons discussed in this essay. The
durability of these dictatorships is seen
as a negative by those within and outside the region who hope for democratization in the Arab world. However,
there are positives to political stability
that warrant attention: by reducing the
incidences of politically chaotic events
such as coups and other autocratic
seizures of power, these regimes shield
their citizens from the often disastrous
economic consequences and violence
that accompany them.
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